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Abstract—Data analyses in the life sciences are moving from 
tools run on a personal computer to services run on large 
computing platforms. This creates a need to package tools and 
dependencies for easy installation, configuration and deployment 
on distributed platforms. In addition, for secure execution there 
is a need for process isolation on a shared platform. Existing 
virtual machine and container technologies are often more 
complex than traditional Unix utilities, like chroot, and often 
require root privileges in order to set up or use. This is especially 
challenging on HPC systems where users typically do not have 
root access. We therefore present nsroot, a lightweight Linux 
namespaces based process isolation tool. It allows restricting the 
runtime environment of data analysis tools that may not have 
been designed with security as a top priority, in order to reduce 
the risk and consequences of security breaches, without requiring 
any special privileges. The codebase of nsroot is small, and it 
provides a command line interface similar to chroot. It can be 
used on all Linux kernels that implement user namespaces.  In 
addition, we propose combining nsroot with the AppImage 
format for secure execution of packaged applications. nsroot is 
open sourced and available at: https://github.com/uit-no/nsroot 
Keywords—containers, process isolation, namespaces, data 
analysis, genomics data 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Container and virtual machine technologies are vital for 
secure and portable execution on computing platforms such as 
clouds. For scientific computing the use of container 
technologies, such as Docker [1], rkt (https://coreos.com/rkt/) 
and Snapcraft (http://snapcraft.io/), have the potential to make 
data analysis applications easier to install, port, and use. 
Specifically, containers allow packaging the application with 
its dependencies in a self-contained container that can easily be 
executed on a wide variety of computing platforms. However, 
container technologies rely on operating system services to 
provide the application with a name space and protection from 
other application. Hence, these must rely on operating system 
features that may not be available in all kernels and 
distributions, or they may require root access. 
Our work is motivated by our experiences developing, 
deploying, and maintaining the META-pipe metagenomics 
data analysis service [2]. Such genomic data analysis is 
typically done through a collection of tools arranged in a 
pipeline where the output of one tool is the input to the next 
tool. The data transformations include file conversion, data 
cleaning, normalization, and data integration. A specific 
biological data analysis project often requires a deep workflow 
that combines 10-20 tools [3]. There are many libraries [4]–[6] 
with hundreds of tools, ranging from small, user-created scripts 
to large, complex applications [7]. Each tool has dependencies 
in form of libraries, but also data files such as specific versions 
of reference databases. These dependencies make it difficult to 
install, configure, and deploy a pipeline on a new computing 
platform. There are therefore recent initiatives, such as 
BioDocker (https://github.com/BioDocker) that aim to provide 
packaged genomics data analysis tools in containers.  
The cost of producing genomics data is rapidly decreasing 
(http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts), so it has become 
necessary to move the analyses from the single server typically 
used to high performance clusters or clouds [2], [3], [8]. Since 
porting and maintaining a deep data analysis pipeline on a 
cluster or cloud is time-consuming and requires access to a 
large amount of compute and storage resources, it is 
increasingly common to provide a pipeline as a data analysis 
service. Recent examples of such services include Illumina 
Basespace (https://basespace.illumina.com/home/index), EBI 
Metagenomics [9], our META-pipe [2] and other pipelines 
provided by the Norwegian eInfrastructure for Life Sciences 
(https://nels.bioinfo.no/). For such services security is 
important since the service may be used to process sensitive, 
scientifically valuable, or commercially valuable data on behalf 
of a user. This is further complicated since the pipeline consists 
of third party tools that may not have high code quality, that 
have not been properly tested, and that are executed as the 
same user on the cloud or HPC backend. So it is especially 
important to isolate the individual pipeline tool executions 
from each other. Another challenge is that, unlike IaaS 
services, HPC systems are often provided as a traditional 
shared UNIX system where users typically do not have root 
access. This complicates the task of installing complex 
application dependencies. 
An ideal container solution would be one that would let us 
package all of our application dependencies inside the same 
Jar-file that we submit to our Spark cluster while at the same 
time provide full process isolation for the 3rd party tools that 
are run within the workflow. This would also make it easy to 
know which tools (and versions) were involved in processing a 
dataset since they would all be part of the application bundle. 
However, to our knowledge no existing solution existed that 
satisfies all needs. Existing virtual machine and container 
technologies are often more complex than traditional Unix 
utilities, like chroot, and often require root privileges. 
In this paper we discuss our solution for minimalistic 
process isolation. It solves the problem of isolating an 
application from the rest of the filesystem and it also lets us 
restrict an application from communicating with other 
applications via network or IPC by using the network- and IPC 
namespaces. Our solution, called nsroot provides process 
isolation by making use of Linux namespaces in order to 
provide an isolated root file system for a process (similar to 
chroot) while at the same time cutting it off the network. This 
enables us to run applications with all their dependencies is a 
single directory while at the same time providing extra security 
through extra process isolation. In addition, we combine nsroot 
with AppImage container to provide a simple, packaged bundle 
for an application. Finally, we propose using nsroot with 
AppImage and package those inside a Java Jar file for easy 
submission to a Spark cluster. 
nsroot works on Linux kernels newer than 3.10, and we 
have successfully tested it on the Fedora 22 and Ubuntu 14.04 
LTS. 
II. NSROOT 
nsroot is a process isolation tool that makes use of 
namespaces to allow an application to change the root 
directory. It is designed to be lightweight and minimalistic to 
ensure wide portability across Linux kernel versions and 
distributions. It can be used to run processes within their own 
virtual root file system, which in turn allows the caller full 
control over absolute paths that are referenced by the program. 
Unlike other container tools, like Docker or LXC, nsroot 
does not require any installation. Instead it can be packaged as 
part of an application bundle. 
A. Usage 
To use nsroot, we first create a new root file system 
containing the application and all its dependencies. The root 
filesystem can be created by for example setting up the 
application in a docker container and then using docker to 
export the application files and dependencies to the new root 
directory. Alternatively, the root file system can be manually 
created, or it may consist of a statically linked self-contained 
application. We also describe below how nsroot can be 
combined with AppImage to provide extra isolation for 
containers. 
Second, we create a new directory for the old root 
filesystem in a subdirectory of the new root. This is needed by 
the PIVOT_ROOT system call (http://man7.org/linux/man-
pages/man2/pivot_root.2.html) that changes the root directory. 
Third, we call nsroot with the same parameters as chroot in 
order to change into the new filesystem. We can also specify 
bind-mounts in order to mount existing directories into this 
new root file system. To further restrict which processes the 
contained process can communicate with we can apply the 
network and IPC namespaces. We can validate that the network 
namespace is used by calling ifconfig inside the container. 
B. Namespaces 
We implemented nsroot by using namespaces as described 
in the NAMESPACES man page (http://man7.org/linux/man-
pages/man7/namespaces.7.html). In particular, we are using 
mount namespaces in order to change the mount table for a 
single process tree and we are using the user namespace in 
order to do so without requiring root access 
(https://www.toptal.com/linux/separation-anxiety-isolating-
your-system-with-linux-namespaces). We also found a tutorial 
about  mount namespaces useful for this project 
(https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/l-mount-
namespaces). 
As described in the man page [] “User namespaces isolate 
security-related identifiers and attributes, in particular, user 
IDs and group IDs […], the root directory, keys […], and 
capabilities […].  A process's user and group IDs can be 
different inside and outside a user namespace.  In particular, a 
process can have a normal unprivileged user ID outside a user 
namespace while at the same time having a user ID of 0 inside 
the namespace; in other words, the process has full privileges 
for operations inside the user namespace, but is unprivileged 
for operations outside the namespace.” 
In other words, the process can run with root privileges in a 
user namespace without actually having root privileges 
elsewhere. Summarized, our code does the following: 
1. Clone the process using the appropriate namespaces. 
This includes at least the user and mount namespaces 
(CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWNS) 
2. Subprocess bind-mounts the new root filesystem into a 
subdirectory in the new root (for example 
/path/to/newroot/mnt). 
3. pivot_root is called in order to make newroot the new 
root filesystem. The old root filesystem becomes 
available under /mnt 
4. User-specified shared directories are bind mounted 
from the old root filesystem (available under /mnt) into 
the new root file system. 
5. The old root filesystem (/mnt) is unmounted  
6. execvp is called in order to replace the current process 
image with an executable specified by the user. 
C. Implementation 
nsroot is implemented in C and it consists of less than 500 
lines of code. It has no dependencies other than the kernel. 
User namespaces were implemented in the Linux kernel 
version 3.8. We have tested nsroot with Linux kernels newer 
than 3.10 (Fedora 22 and Ubuntu 14.04). However, it does not 
currently work on CentOS since it does not yet support user 
namespaces (http://rhelblog.redhat.com/2015/07/07/whats-
next-for-containers-user-namespaces/). 
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
We believe nsroot can be used to provide extra isolation 
for minimalistic container technologies. These can then be 
used to package and execute for example data analysis tools as 
Spark jobs. This combination makes it easier to port legacy 
genomics data analysis pipelines to the Spark framework. In 
this section we present our proposed solution. 
A. AppImage 
AppImage (http://appimage.org/) is a technology for 
packaging applications for Linux. An AppImage application is 
a single ELF executable file that contains all of the 
application’s dependencies and it is self-contained. nsroot can 
be used in an AppImage to provide extra isolation via Linux 
namespaces. 
Using nsroot within an AppImage has several advantages. 
First, it provides software packaging to nsroot. Second, it 
allows to run less-than-secure AppImages in isolation. Third, 
nsroot removes the problem of absolute paths. Fourth, it 
increases security by stricter isolation, which is especially 
beneficial if the installed AppImage becomes old or 
unpatched. 
The above observations are also shared by the firejail 
(https://github.com/netblue30/firejail) tool that is implemented 
similarly to nsroot and that can already be used with the 
AppImage format.  
B. Spark Pipelines 
Bioinformatics workflows running on Apache Spark could 
benefit from using nsroot for isolating the execution of legacy 
3rd party tools. In particular, we could package all of our 
application dependencies inside the same Jar-file that we 
submit to our Spark cluster using AppImage, and then use 
nsroot to provide full process isolation for the 3rd party tools 
that are run within the workflow. 
C. Teaching Tool 
We believe that the minimalistic design, and the 420 lines 
code, of nsroot makes it useful as a teaching tool. For example, 
nsroot could be used in a project about containers in an 
operating systems course. 
IV. RELATED WORK 
In this section we describe related work in process isolation 
tools based on Linux user namespaces and container 
technologies. In addition, we discuss how containers are used 
for genomics data analysis. 
A. nsjail and firejail 
At the same time when we developed nsroot, other projects 
developed similar tools. nsjail (http://google.github.io/nsjail/) 
was started the day before nsroot, and firejail 
(https://firejail.wordpress.com/) had its first beta release in 
April 2014. Both nsjail and firejail uses Linux user 
namespaces, similarly to nsroot, for process isolation, and in 
addition they use seccomp-bpf to filter system calls. nsjail uses 
resource limits and cgroups to limit the CPU, memory usage, 
and address space sizes of applications. nsjail also provides 
virtual network inside the application (although this requires 
root access to setup). firejail natively supports the AppImage 
format. 
The main advantage of nsroot over nsjail and firejail is that 
nsroot maintains compatibility with the chroot command and it 
has a smaller codebase (since it has fewer features). We believe 
this makes the command line interface easier to understand and 
use. 
B. Containers and Virtual Machines 
Both Virtual machines (VMs) and containers are 
technologies used to provide an isolated environment for 
applications. They are both binaries that can be transferred 
between hosts. While a VM includes an application, its 
dependencies and an entire OS, containers share the underlying 
host OS and contain only the application and dependencies 
making them smaller in size. Containers are isolated processes 
in user space on the host OS. (as described in 
https://www.docker.com/what-docker).  
In [10] Docker containers are shown to have better than, or 
equal performance as VMs. Both forms of virtualization 
techniques introduce overhead in I/O-intensive workloads, 
especially in VMs, but introduce negligible CPU and memory 
overhead.   
For genomics pipelines the overhead of Docker containers 
will be negligible since these tend to be compute intensive and 
they typically run for several hours [11]. 
C. Containers in Life Science Research 
Recent projects propose to use containers for life science 
research. The BioDocker (https://github.com/BioDocker) and 
Bioboxes [12] projects addresses the challenge of installing 
bioinformatics data analysis tools by maintaining a repository 
of docker containers for commonly used data analysis tools.  
Containers have also been proposed as a solution to 
improve experiment reproducibility, by ensuring that the data 
analysis tools are installed with the same responsibilities [13].  
V. CONCLUSION 
We have presented our nsroot process isolation tool. It uses 
the Linux user namespaces to allow application processes to 
run with root privileges without actually having root privileges 
outside of the user namespace. We propose using nsroot for 
secure packaged application execution, and for Spark job 
distribution. 
Our work was motivated by our experiences developing a 
genomics data analysis service that we have designed for cloud 
execution. We plan to use nsroot, and the proposed Spark 
solution to install, configure, deploy, and securely execute the 
data analysis tools for user submitted data using a single cloud 
user. Although we focused on genomics data analysis, we 
believe our solution can also be used for data analysis pipelines 
in other fields. nsroot and the proposed solutions are especially 
suited for deep pipelines with potentially insecure third party 
tools. 
As future work we intend to implement the proposed 
integration with AppImage and the Java jar file deployment. 
We also plan to explore the possibility of providing versioned 
datasets to ensure complete reproducibility of a pipeline using 
for example Pachyderm (http://pachyderm.io/), which is a 
project that provides version control for data and a 
containerized pipeline system.  
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